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Abstract: Present regulations and prohibitions relating to psychoactive 
substances rest upon socio-historically contingent and hence 
arguably irrational foundations. New evidence bases located in post-
genomic genetics and neuroscience hold the potential to disrupt 
them through demonstrating a lack of congruence between the 
regulations and prohibitions and the alleged and actual harms. How 
far might we use such knowledge to drive policy? What limits, if any, 
should be placed on our choices, and what attempts to influence 
these may be seen as acceptable? This article seeks to address 
these questions in relation to criminal justice system and public 
health governance of psychoactive substance use. It will explore the 
implications of justifications employed in both areas to restrict free 
choice on the grounds of harm to the self and to others. The central 
argument made is that the current categorisation of psychoactive 
substances as lawful or unlawful is likely to become disrupted as the 
result of several separate discourses which converge over 
psychoactive substance use: enhancement, cognitive liberty and the 
degree to which subjective experiences of pleasure, well being and 
happiness might enable us to improve and maintain our health as 
individuals and that of society as a whole. In my view, the strategic 
deployment of concepts of addiction which has enabled the public 
health and criminal justice systems to be able to share governance 
over psychoactive substance use is likely to become destabilised by 
these discursive developments. In that policy in the United Kingdom 
and elsewhere now draws upon happiness research, while reformers 
advocate freedom of choice over means of enhancing our states of 
being, a new focus upon the rational evaluation of psychoactive 
substances governance seems plausible.  





This paper will explore the impact of happiness research, cognitive liberty, 
enhancement, post-genomic genetics and neuroscience discourses on strategic 
deployment of concepts of addiction in public health and criminal justice system 
governance. Current thinking frames governance over citizens in neo-liberal 
consumer societies as resting upon our making rational choices over consumables and 
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activities in the name of freedom in order to maximise our health, wealth and 
happiness.1 These aspirations may conflict. Research reveals that although if we are 
unemployed or in ill-health we are less likely to be happy, once we have achieved a 
modicum of wealth becoming richer renders us only slightly happier, whereas 
psychoactive substances and activities may increase our happiness, but only 
sometimes our health.2 Psychoactive substances, or those which alter the way our 
minds function and how we feel, are diverse. Any substance ingested, like food, and 
many activities, like exercise, alter our moods and hence how we perceive the world 
and experience our lives. Some, like opiates, may make us feel better in a dual sense, 
in that they may form the basis of medical treatment as well as enhancing our 
subjective experiences. Yet when many are taken to excess, feeling good may turn to 
feeling bad. Too much sugar makes us sick, too much amphetamine makes us 
paranoid and too much exercise makes our joints give out. 
 
This complex potential renders psychoactive substances uniquely central to 
governance strategies which focus upon inculcating rational choice. Both public 
health and criminal justice systems rely upon justifications of harm to oneself or to 
others and notions of addiction to regulate or prohibit our consumption of 
psychoactive substances. Training us to eschew the short-term pleasures of a sugar 
rush for the long-term happiness of good health provides a template for rational 
consumer choices and the conservation of healthcare resources. Coding pleasure as 
risk encourages us to measure enjoyment in terms of degrees of harm posed to 
ourselves and to others. Thus we should calculate that the pleasure obtained from too 
much of a lawful psychoactive substance, or any amount of an unlawful one, leaves us 
vulnerable to risks associated with addiction and/or criminal liability. Yet present 
regulations and prohibitions relating to psychoactive substances rest upon sociohistorically 
contingent and hence arguably irrational foundations. Thus new evidence 
bases located in post-genomic genetics and neuroscience hold the potential to disrupt 
them through demonstrating a lack of congruence between the regulations and 
prohibitions and the alleged and actual harms. 
 
How far might we use such knowledge to drive policy? What limits, if any, should be 
placed on our choices, and what attempts to influence these may be seen as 
acceptable? This article seeks to address these questions in relation to criminal justice 
system and public health governance of psychoactive substance use. It will explore 
the implications of justifications employed in both areas to restrict free choice on the 
grounds of harm to the self and to others. The central argument made is that the 
current categorisation of psychoactive substances as lawful or unlawful is likely to 
become disrupted as the result of several separate discourses which converge over 
psychoactive substance use: enhancement, cognitive liberty and the degree to which 
subjective experiences of pleasure, well being and happiness might enable us to 
improve and maintain our health as individuals and that of society as a whole. In my 
view, the strategic deployment of concepts of addiction which has enabled the public 
health and criminal justice systems to be able to share governance over psychoactive 
substance use is likely to become destabilised by these discursive developments. In 
that policy in the United Kingdom and elsewhere now draws upon happiness research, 
while reformers advocate freedom of choice over means of enhancing our states of 
being, a new focus upon the rational evaluation of psychoactive substances 
governance seems plausible. In addition, policy moves to encourage the 
biotechnological industry to join public/private partnerships, taken together with the 
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commercial potential of ‘biovalue’,3 or profit generated by products anchored in the 
biological characteristics of life itself, enhancement technologies and ‘cosmetic 
neurology’, provide an economic environment hospitable to this.4 
 
Policy, happiness research and harm to oneself and to others 
 
Deriving the normative from evidence bases poses perils for policymakers. Yet, 
nonetheless, recent calls for them to draw upon national indicators of subjective 
wellbeing, or how people evaluate their lives in terms of happiness, to craft policies 
which will maximise happiness are proving increasingly influential.5 For instance, 
governance in the United Kingdom has been informed by the work of Professor Lord 
Richard Layard, who has reread utilitarianism in the light of neurochemical and social 
science research to provide a justification for recommending wide ranging policy 
changes such as minimising income and social inequalities in order to maximise our 
health and happiness.6 He contends that since we innately seek to feel good, and 
experience happiness, pleasure or wellbeing through altruism, trust and fellow feeling, 
policies which support our happiness when this does not harm either us or others may 
promote individual and social flourishing.7 Not only does happiness cause success,8 
both feelings of happiness in the sense of pleasure, as well as the eudaimonic 
wellbeing we experience when our lives make sense to us, are good for our health.9 
 
Nonetheless, not all happinesses are equal. For instance, as those involved in public 
health and criminal justice system governance wish us to maintain our health and to 
remain within the law, we must be persuaded to find happiness in choosing to 
consume carrots rather than cake or crack cocaine. Such decisions are commonly 
distinguished in terms of sub-optimal choices of short-term pleasures as opposed to 
rational adherence to practices promoting long-term happiness. Thus policymakers are 
likely to seek to influence how we define and experience happiness as opposed to 
pleasure, and may take a pick and mix approach to the results of research according to 
how well these match their political views.10 Although happiness researchers may 
disagree over how far policy interventions should engage in social engineering to 
modify our less than optimal choices, governance inevitably seeks to shape them.11 
Thus while proposals by the Secretary of State for Health to raise our levels of 
happiness and conserve healthcare resources by restoring our mental health, getting us 
off incapacity benefits and back into the workplace as advocated by Lord Layard 
demonstrate the potential for post-genomic genetics and neuroscience to anchor 
public health and social policy, they also suggest how far this potential might support 
coercive social measures.12 
 
Nor is drawing upon happiness research as a basis for policy measures 
straightforward where criminal justice system policy over psychoactive substances is 
concerned. Whereas Lord Layard’s proposals rest upon demonstrable measures of 
happiness which permit a degree of normative extrapolation, many things which make 
us happy or provide us with pleasure are criminalised. Some sanctions may be 
justified in terms of harm caused to others: while my happiness might be increased by 
my stealing your Ferrari Testarossa, this would cause you harm so I should be 
punished or deterred from doing so. Other offences may provide happiness without 
necessarily harming others. Many clubbers who take ecstasy achieve happiness 
without apparent damage to themselves or others, or, at the very least, with less harm 
than that caused to and by those who consume alcohol within the law. While Lord 
Layard has adverted to this issue in passing, it has not formed a major focus of his 
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rereading of utilitarianism.13 Nonetheless, it has anchored other initiatives which seek 
to reform the present categorisation of psychoactive substances as legal or illegal. 
Supporters of legalisation or decriminalisation of at least some currently unlawful 
psychoactive substances allege that the harms caused by rendering certain drugs 
illegal far exceeds that the drugs themselves might pose to individuals who consume 
them or to society at large, although many regard this claim as unproven or 
unproveable.14 
 
Current controversies over the ethics of human enhancement approach the area of 
harm and psychoactive substances from a different perspective. Pharmaceuticals 
which hold the promise of making us ‘better than well’ risk being proscribed as 
designer drugs unless they can be sold as medicines.15 Thus they have the potential to 
alter our perception of what it is to be healthy. In that they may be made available to 
the public only via prescription, their manufacturers promote them as medications to 
treat a plethora of new ‘lifestyle’ disease entities such as female sexual dysfunction, 
allegedly experienced by almost 50% of women.16 Underpinning this situation is the 
assumption that while we may ethically intervene in order to remedy harms such as 
illness to restore sufferers to a state of natural health, to seek to move beyond therapy 
to enhance our capacities, particularly where this involves irreversible change, is 
selfish, unfair, threatens human nature and compromises human dignity.17 This stance 
has been challenged. Those who favour enhancement see anti-meliorist views as 
philosophically suspect bioconservatism, based upon overly narrow conceptions of 
humanity, dignity and autonomy.18 Transhumanists, characterising humanity as a work 
in progress, assert a right to self-transformation which may or may not involve 
psychoactive substance use.19 
 
Such a right is allied to that put forward by supporters of cognitive liberty, who argue 
that the First Amendment on Freedom of Thought of the United States Constitution is 
‘meaningless without an inherent right to autonomy and self-determination over one’s 
own functional neurochemistry’.20 This right would entail not only the right to 
autonomous decisions over consuming psychoactive substances but also the ability to 
refuse pharmaceutical intervention in the form of compulsory pharmacotherapy, such 
as vaccines which would block the pleasure inducing effects of illegal drugs.21 Claims 
to a right to cognitive liberty also draw upon post-genomic genetics and neuroscience 
to assert aspirations to enhancement by pharmaceutical means. Exercising such rights 
or aspirations may well involve the consumption of unlawful psychoactive 
substances, yet prohibiting our doing so is alleged to be difficult to justify in terms of 
harm to others outweighing our freedom to seek personal happiness. Indeed, the 
notion of harm may be deployed to suggest that we suffer significant harm if we are 
prevented from exercising rights to autonomy over how we pursue happiness, self-
transformation and cognitive liberty. 
 
Thus post-genomic genetics and neuroscience reveal potentials for us to reinvent 
ourselves, to enhance our happiness, health or humanity and to experience 
cornucopias of pleasures. As Wolpe explains, ‘[n]eurological biotechnologies differ 
from others in that they ask us to explicitly consider the kind of ‘self’ we want to 
have; or, to put it less dualistically, perhaps, the kind of self we want to be’.22 In 
similar vein, the rereading of utilitarianism spurs us on to engage in choices which 
will maximise our happiness. Extant or future psychoactive substances afford us with 
opportunities to do so, yet our availing ourselves of these may conflict with public 
health and criminal justice system governance. Ways in which conceptions of 
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addiction are used strategically to resolve or conceal these contradictions will now be 
explored. 
 
Post-genomic genetics, neuroscience and the governance of addiction 
 
Criminal justice and public health governance both deploy the notion of addiction as a 
central trope. If we are seen as addicted, we have harmed ourselves through an 
unhealthy seeking after pleasure, and pose harm to others through placing excess 
burdens on healthcare resources, or committing crimes to fund our drug abuse. Yet 
classification of psychoactive substances as lawful (alcohol, nicotine), unlawful 
(cocaine) and/or medicinal (opiates, cannabis) is socio-historically contingent,23 and 
fails to conform with their potential to harm our health.24 Nonetheless, sizeable tax 
revenues from alcohol and tobacco, combined with international agreements 
mandating a war on drugs, have sustained a categorisation which conflicts with both 
the impetus to enhancement and with those who assert rights to cognitive liberty.25 We, 
as self-reflexive citizens, are expected to exercise our wills judiciously, to choose lawful 
pleasures and to maintain healthy lifestyles. Those of us who do not are liable to be seen 
as engaging in sub-optimal choices, and to be condemned for losing control. 26 Should 
we be deemed to seek pleasure excessively or inappropriately through consuming 
unlawful psychoactive substances, we may be subsumed under criminal justice or 
public health models and punished or treated for addiction accordingly. 
 
How far might post-genomic genetics and neuroscience anchor policy here? Some of us 
find ourselves unwilling or unable to restrict our pleasures. Research establishing the 
neurochemistry of reward pathways in the brain has associated this with genetic 
susceptibilities. Some of us are more likely to take risks to increase our stores of 
dopamine, some of us can resist psychoactive substances more than others and still 
more of us have difficulty changing patterns of consumption once they have become 
habitual. Views on how to characterise this vary over time and place. Moral censure and 
the involvement of the criminal justice system prevail where intoxications are 
associated with failures of the will, harmful impacts upon others and unlawful acts. 
Under a public health model, however, addictions are characterised as chronic, 
relapsing conditions which should attract treatment rather than punishment or 
incarceration. 
 
Jurisdictions exercise governance through these alternative models in varying 
fashions, which impact upon specific groups in different ways, often commensurate 
with social stratification.27 In addition, in the United States the emphasis upon the war 
on drugs has fostered a framing of unlawful psychoactive substance use within the 
criminal justice paradigm of punishment as prevention of harm to others, on the 
assumption that many offend in order to support drug abuse. Treatment programmes 
for offenders operate under the aegis of the drug courts, with the aim of eradicating 
both habits. Elsewhere, particularly in Europe and the Antipodes, the harm reduction 
movement leans more towards the public health treatment model. Here reducing 
harms to users and others is fostered by treatment programmes and measures which 
provide support for those using unlawful drugs, such as providing them as part of 
medical treatment.28 The United Kingdom draws from both approaches. 
 
What impact should the revelation of varying genetic susceptibilities to different 
forms of addiction have upon offenders? Should my liability for breaking the law be 
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tempered by the fact that my genetic make-up and neurochemistry incline me towards 
taking undue risks, thereby making unlawful psychoactive substance use more of a 
temptation? How far should my lowly social status, statistically correlated with my 
risk profile, be taken into account? Classically the criminal justice system has been 
unwilling to allow evidence of genetic or biological variations to influence ideas of 
culpability. Where sentencing options are concerned, however, offenders who are 
categorised as suffering from addictions may be offered treatment for these, often 
within contexts which are presented as therapeutic. Civil liberties protections may be 
waived by the offenders, while the penalties of incarceration recede where judges 
consider that a cure against re-offending based upon addiction has taken place. 
Misgivings have been expressed over the assertion of biological culpabilities as 
justifying the removal of such crucial protections.29 
 
While the DSM-IV-R uses the more recent clinical term drug dependence to classify 
those who are deemed to overuse or abuse psychoactive substances, neuroscientists 
continue to favour the label of addiction as denoting neural adaptations which foster a 
loss of control over urges to take a drug. Within this model, the pleasure which comes 
from taking psychoactive substances tempts us to do so excessively. If we do, our 
volition may be compromised as pure psychoactive drugs ‘bypass adaptive 
information processing systems and act directly on ancient brain mechanisms that 
control emotion and behaviour’.30 Even where homeostatic mechanisms within the 
brain ensure that we no longer experience pleasure from consuming the drug, once we 
are addicted we crave it nonetheless, so that our ability to decide not to take it, not to 
damage the rest of our life by seeking it out, or to enjoy the ordinary pleasures of life 
becomes seriously compromised.31 Hence drug addiction is characterised as ‘a 
chronic, relapsing disorder in which compulsive drug seeking and drug taking 
behaviour persists despite serious negative consequences. … Continued use induces 
adaptive changes in the central nervous system that lead to tolerance, physical 
dependence, sensitisation, craving and relapse’.32 
 
It is currently estimated that genetic factors account for 40-60% of vulnerability to 
addiction, either as genetic variations, through gene-environment interactions or via 
variable metabolism of drugs or sensitivity to their effects.33 Rewarding experiences 
associated with drugs or with what is usually termed ‘natural’ rewards, ie other 
pleasure inducing substances or activities such as sugar or sex, produce similar effects 
in the brain. It seems likely that all drugs which are subject to abuse share common 
neural and molecular pathways which provide reward and promote addiction.34 Thus, 
as identifiable neuronal mechanisms underlie rewards, craving, relapse and the 
disruption of the ability to experience pleasure, addiction ‘is best conceptualised as a 
disease of brain reward centres that ensure the survival of organisms and species’.35 
From this perspective, volition is compromised by neuroadaptations associated with 
addiction which induce relapse.36 Both patients with damage to the ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex, the part of the brain associated with reflective decision-making, and 
those addicted to substance abuse persistently engage in choices which lead to 
significant harms in their lives. Neural mechanisms which enable the amygdala 
system, a part of the brain involved in the experience of pain and pleasure, to hijack 
the capacity to abjure short term gains for long term goals as a result of addiction have 
been put forward as an explanation for addicts’ loss of will power.37 Thus compulsive 
drug-seeking and drug-taking behaviour is facilitated by difficulties in decision 
making and a compromised ability to judge the consequences of one's own actions. 
These genetic and neuronal effects on the wills of those suffering from addiction have 
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obvious implications for the criminal justice system, where punishment is coded to 
mens rea, or volition. Punishment for voluntary prohibited actions preserves the 
viability of social groups by curtailing the activity of free riders, and may precede 
reintegration.38 However, the extent to which prohibited actions may be considered 
sufficiently volitional to attract punishment within the criminal law is problematic. 
New neuroimaging technologies suggest that the genomic and genetic underpinnings 
of choice may undercut current notions of moral responsibility. Nonetheless, these do 
not at present indicate mental states at times crimes are committed.39 Mental condition 
defences are based upon the materialist assumption that abnormalities or diseases of 
the mind may be located in malfunctions of the brain.40 Yet even materialist evidence 
of brain functioning may be difficult to interpret in these terms. How useful, then, are 
neuroscientific explanations and technological possibilities for criminal justice 
systems wherein offenders may be seen as addicted? 
 
A salient caveat here is the increasing complexities revealed by post-genomic 
genetics. The subtleties of varieties of gene expression, how each variation may result 
in differing behaviours and the ways in which epigenetics has demonstrated that 
environment may impact on inherited characteristics all make it clear that 
straightforward assertions of genetic cause and effect cannot be put forward 
convincingly.41 Correlation and statistical associations between biology and 
behaviour, however, produce hypotheses of possible mechanisms here, many of which 
are gradually being bolstered by ongoing research. This picture is complicated where 
investigations of addiction to psychoactive substances are concerned. Much of the 
extant knowledge of the neuroscience of addiction, neurotransmitters in general and 
the impact on behaviour comes from the use of animal models.42 Ethical factors 
restrict the range of investigations which would be approved for human subjects. 
Varieties of effect and mechanism exist amongst different species of non-human 
animals, between these and humans, and amongst humans. 
 
Much of the research involving human subjects where dependence upon psychoactive 
substances is being investigated is also complicated by the fact that many of these 
substances are unlawful. Access to the both subjects and substances is thus 
compromised. Even where human subjects are available, the fact that many who are 
seen as abusing psychoactive substances suffer from various co-morbidities, such as 
mental illness, renders verification of comparisons and conclusions difficult. Indeed, 
one of the commonly accepted rationales for co-morbidity is that substance abuse 
represents an attempt to self-medicate by those experiencing uncomfortable mental 
states.43 A further obstacle is that those who depend upon psychoactive substances 
tend to avail themselves of more than one, rendering generalisations over the effect of 
a specific substance problematic.44 Accordingly, assertions about the neuroscience of 
criminal responsibility, pleasure and addiction rest upon suggestive rather than certain 
scientific foundations. To claim otherwise would be to engage in what Healy has 
condemned as biobabble.45 In addition, there are obvious philosophical difficulties 
inherent in connecting biological substrates with both subjective experiences and 
conscious and volitional actions.46 Although as outlined above Lord Layard’s 
rereading of utilitarianism, based partially on neurochemical evidence, has influenced 
policy in the United Kingdom, many philosophers and ethicists contend that it is both 
impossible and inappropriate for neuroscience to be seen as providing the potential to 
replace normative questions with scientific ones.47 
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What, then, might the neuroscience and post-genomic genetics associated with 
psychoactive substance use contribute towards criminal justice system governance? 
Evidence of compromised volition seems unlikely to overturn present interpretations 
of mens rea, or criminal responsibility, in the near future. Yet, where this may be 
interpreted as addiction, a disease in need of treatment, it can be framed in terms of its 
constituting harm to oneself and one’s health, as well as a motivation for harm against 
others in the sense of crimes against property or persons embarked upon in order to 
sustain unlawful psychoactive substance use. Criminal justice system and public 
health governance thus converge over the treatment of offenders who may be 
classified as addicts. It is to this territory I now wish to turn. 
 
Addiction in public health and criminal justice system governance 
 
Both public health and criminal justice authorities possess coercive powers. Should 
serious infectious diseases threaten us, we may be segregated, forcibly treated and 
incarcerated in order to protect the rest of the populace. Similar mechanisms ensure 
that offenders are imprisoned and punished. Ideally, overreaching of these powers is 
kept in check by human rights and civil liberties procedural protections. While public 
health and criminal justice both possess claims to heal individuals and society at large, 
then, these are underpinned by significant access to lawful force. We may be 
compelled to accept treatment or punishment when the larger interests of society are 
seen as being at stake. It is these wider social interests which purportedly underlie 
public health and the criminal justice system’s classification of some pleasures as 
preferable or lawful. For example, the endogenous opiates we produce through 
exercise are to be encouraged, whereas the exogenous equivalents we may purchase in 
the form of heroin are to be prohibited in part because we may commit crimes to fund 
our habit. 
 
Nor are all lawful sources of neurochemicals seen as equivalent. Public health’s 
concern with resource allocation and the consequences of overindulgence in lawful 
psychoactive substances such as alcohol, nicotine and food has resulted in policies 
which seek to moderate our access to them. Restrictions upon places where one might 
smoke, raising taxes on alcohol and the proscription of certain types of food being 
sold in schools are some recent examples. Criminal justice policies aim to prohibit or 
to exact retribution for the consumption of unlawful psychoactive substances. Public 
health and criminal justice system approaches overlap where offenders are directed 
towards programmes which purport to treat addictions. Here the procedural 
protections associated with civil liberties within the criminal justice system are 
typically relaxed. Participants, in effect, are offered the choice of defining themselves 
as ill or bad, ie as suffering from addiction as a chronic, relapsing disease or as 
wilfully engaging in prohibited behaviours which damage both themselves and the 
larger social fabric. In this light, those who complete the therapeutic programmes 
successfully escape punitive measures such as incarceration, whereas those who fail 
to complete are subjected to them.48 The neuroscience of addiction traversed above 
offers supplementary measures of treatment which give rise to concerns over the civil 
liberties of those offenders who may become subjected to them. 
 
Medications which remove the rewards or stimulate unpleasant side effects when 
specific psychoactive substances are taken, or vaccinations with similar effect, are 
potential forms of compulsory treatment for both actual and potential offenders. Thus 
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individuals with genetic formations associated with a predisposition towards 
addiction, particularly children, may receive vaccinations, with or without consent, as 
a preventative measure. Analogies with allegations of the over-prescription of ritalin, 
tranquillisers and anti-depressants forming part of public health governance are clear. 
Compulsory treatment, the use of neuroscientific technologies to identify actual and 
potential offenders and the compromised capacity of vulnerable offenders and minors 
to consent to such treatment raise separate ethical issues. As these have been explored 
elsewhere, they will not be considered further here.49 Hence the definition of 
addiction as disease, especially when in the context of criminal justice system 
proscription, gives rise to significant misgivings over compulsory treatments. These 
acquire additional force from the spectre of relaxed civil liberties protections 
associated with treatment within the criminal justice system, suggesting prolonged 
and indefinite liabilities as a very real possibility.50 
 
The reformatory force of public health and criminal justice system measures in this 
arena are aimed at encouraging those subjected to them to aspire to a model of selfreflexive 
micro-management where conditions defined as disease are eschewed, socalled 
cures embraced and experiences of pleasure subsumed within a civic aspiration 
to health. This model frames happiness as eschewing short-term pleasures and 
minimising harm to oneself or others. Both public health and criminal justice system 
governance thus characterise pleasure seeking where psychoactive substances are 
concerned in terms of curtailment. Finding too much pleasure in ‘excessive’ 
consumption of lawful substances, or in habitually resorting to those prohibited by the 
law, is deemed to be inappropriate. Yet, nonetheless, many of us continue to do so. At 
times, most of us choose pleasure over perfect health and virtuous self-restraint. 
Indeed, the proponents of cognitive liberty and human enhancement would argue that 
we should be free to direct our own choices here. 
 
Models which seek to explain this seemingly irrational behaviour have veered 
between characterising it as moral weakness or a form of ill-health. Marianna 
Valverde has traced the historical transformations of alcoholism and other ‘diseases of 
the will’ in this light.51 Recently, together with Pat O’Malley, she has elucidated how 
the experience of pleasure has been excluded from public health and criminal justice 
discursive strategies which seek to restrain our consumption of psychoactive 
substances via the rubrics of addiction and drug abuse.52 In my view, however, the 
incorporation of neuroscience into policy discourse and the public imagination has 
now fostered a simultaneous resurgence and co-optation of pleasure which threatens 
this strategic deployment of notions of addiction. 
 
Salutogenesis: the obligatory prudential transforming of pleasure 
 
The impetus within public health policy to persuade us to eschew activities which 
pose risks to our health and espouse those which enhance it is associated with the 
concept of salutogenesis.53 The opposite of pathogenesis, or the origins of ill-health, 
salutogenesis aims to delineate the origins of health and the means by which it might 
be ensured and maintained. Neuroscientific research has contributed to the salutogenic 
programme by revealing the extent to which pleasure not only enhances our health but 
forms a basis of our daily life. Endogenous opiates, for example, ensure that we enjoy 
one another’s company, providing evidence for a postulated human trait of 
affiliation.54 While the neurocircuits in the brain associated with functional 
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salutogenic mechanisms that contribute to health via specific beliefs and practices are 
not yet well understood, associations between certain states of being or beliefs and 
practices and good health are now accepted. If we feel that life makes sense, that we 
can deal with its difficulties, and are able to love at least some of our lives, our gods 
and our fellow men and women, then we will be happier, more likely to be healthy 
than if we do not, and will recover better from ill-health. Psychoactive substances and 
practices may enhance or substitute for these factors. Thus, pleasure is good for us 
because it helps to make us happy and healthy. Lord Layard’s rereading of 
utilitarianism rests upon this neuroscience of well-being and mood control. Public 
health and criminal justice systems wishing to draw upon pleasure as a means to 
promote health or discourage vice must thus move forward from the elision of 
pleasure from their discursive strategies noted by O’Malley and Valverde. 
 
Hence, in my view, the neuroscience of salutogenesis, Lord Layard’s rereading of 
utilitarian happiness and recent suggestions that susceptibility to becoming addicted to 
various substances, such as alcohol, or activities, such as risk-taking, may be 
associated with particular genetic formations have together supported a reframing of 
pleasure as the basis of neurochemical algorithms designed to maximise our health. A 
measure of the degree to which this has become part of popular culture is the daily 
exhortations in the tabloids to improve our looks and health by engaging in frequent 
sex with a regular partner,55 to select foods which will maximise our mood enhancing 
neurochemicals,56 to replace our addictions to obesity inducing serotonin imbued 
carbohydrates with the non-calorific mood enhancing endorphins to be found in 
regular cardio-vascular exercise,57 or to log onto a National Health Service affiliated 
website which will advise us on techniques of sexual pleasure.58 Public health 
campaigns encourage us to engage in daily rituals wherein subjective experiences of 
well-being through pleasure are fostered in order to maximise health. Here our 
pleasures are not inherently to be valued, but become subsumed within a public health 
imperative mandating self-reflexive salutogenesis as we become responsibilised to 
engineer and control our moods in order to ensure that we are as healthy as possible. 
 
Rose has drawn attention to the degree to which the daily self-reflexive practices 
associated with the maintenance of health and the scrutiny of our inner lives constitute 
contemporary means of governance.59 For our neurochemical selves,60 prudential 
practices and rational choices associated with the discerning experience of pleasure 
have become daily obligations as we seek, responsibly, to maximise our health. Public 
health policy today expects biological citizens to manage their lives reflexively in 
ways which will maximise their health, longevity and well being.61 Thus, despite 
genuflections towards the right not to know, we are responsiblised in terms of 
discovering our risk profiles, altering our lifestyle practices accordingly and attaining 
prudential mastery of the neurophysiology of mood maintenance. Under the model I 
have put forward, discourses of pleasure become part of a mandatory programme of 
self-maintenance which ensures our long-term health and happiness. Pleasure is 
experienced subjectively as a neurotransmitter symphony we conduct, pumping up the 
volume of serotonin via sex, carbohydrates or prozac. These prudential practices come 
under threat when our desires for pleasure are viewed as intemperate. Judicious 
moderation or modulation of neurochemicals becomes an essential literacy. Foucault’s 
account of the uses of pleasure in classical Greece has at its centre an allied 
aesthetic.62 Indeed, this still forms the basis of suggestions that youthful abusers of 
psychoactive substances might be persuaded to mend their ways by eschewing 
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excess.63 This aesthetics of moderation is threatened by excessive consumption, the 
location of pleasure in disapproved psychoactive substances and pleasure seeking 
habits which interfere with our ability to manage our daily life. It is here where public 
health and criminal justice framings of addiction and substance abuse become salient. 
In conclusion, I shall now explore how my portrayal of the discursive strategies over 
pleasure employed in public health and criminal justice policies may be integrated 
with recent critical theorising on neo-liberalism, governance and addiction. 
 
Discriminating between pleasures, neo-liberal consumer society and 
addiction 
 
Gerda Reith asserts that neo-liberal consumer society creates a fetishism of addiction 
as an artifact of discursive conflicts between consumption, freedom and governance.64 
In her view, citizens in such societies are responsibilised as self-reflexive consumers 
who are both constructed by their freedom to choose amongst commodities and 
constrained by their incapacity to escape the burdens associated with such unending 
rational choices. In these circumstances, the option of adopting the identity of an 
addict, whose ability to engage in volitional choices may be accepted as 
compromised, may prove all too tempting for many. Hence today there is a plethora of 
people defining themselves as addicted to food, sex, shopping, gambling and so forth. 
From this perspective, treatment for addiction becomes a means of returning weakwilled 
citizens to their self-reflexive responsibilities associated with consumer choice. 
The cyclic return of the self-actualising consumer, assuming control over life, is 
framed as a triumph over ‘the daemonic force of addiction’.65 Those who prove 
recalcitrant are subjected to the more explicit coercive powers of the criminal justice 
system. 
 
In Reith’s consumer society, freedom is read as freedom to consume. Hence 
dependence, or lack of freedom, is peculiarly abhorrent, and must be eschewed and 
condemned. As she explains, 
 
‘What is new in modern society is not the emphasis on issues of 
freedom per se, but rather the unprecedented emphasis on freedom 
as a mode of governance by and through the individual. Innermost 
states are the medium through which freedom is controlled, as well 
as the measure of its loss. Today we are governed not against but 
through our freedom, which is why its loss or vitiation is articulated 
in terms of its opposite’.66 
 
How does this fit in with pleasure? O’Malley and Valverde associate the elision of 
pleasure in liberal discourses of addiction with its subsumption within forms of 
rational and responsible enjoyment.67 Agreeing with Fox that pleasure is read as risk 
in public health today, they characterise criminal justice policies embodied in the 
harm minimisation movement as based upon a rational choice actor performing the 
felicity calculus in order to avoid harms rather than to experience pleasures.68 Hence, 
any right to pleasure within a consumer society is in tension with, but subservient to, 
the prudential duty to eschew risk. As they conclude, 
 
‘Liberal government has thus accumulated a battery of pleasure-denying 
characterisations, each with its own discursive 
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effectiveness, each linked with an appropriate set of governing 
techniques. Beastliness requires and justifies force and compulsions; 
compulsive behaviours trigger and validate therapeutics; free choice 
consumers require and are provided with information and skilling. 
Thus does liberalism arm itself with a multiplicity of responses, 
becoming potentially ever more flexible and adaptable in its 
capacity to govern without pleasure’.69 
 
My suggestion in this paper is that neo-liberal governance today has moved on from 
this position. In my view, it now draws upon healthcare’s focus upon salutogenesis, 
post-genomic genetics and neuroscience to colonise pleasure as a means to ensure that 
rational consumers aspire both to maintain neurochemical mood control and to apply 
the aesthetic of moderation to the consumption of lawful psychoactive substances in 
ways which will maximise health. From this perspective, liberalism as portrayed by 
Reith, O’Malley and Valverde governs not without but through both freedom and 
pleasure. Addiction accepted as a chronic relapsing disease provides a rationale for a 
cyclic progression of citizens from the rigours of rational consumption to the shriven 
status of the sick, before their return from excess to self-reflexivity. Yet while the 
evidence from post-genomic genetics and neuroscience provides some support for the 
extension of notions of addiction to ordinary activities like shopping and sex, it also 
undermines the designation of specific psychoactive substances as lawful or unlawful 
on the basis of harm read as addiction. If almost everything we imbibe or do has 
addictive potential, the grounds upon which some things might be prohibited become 
problematic unless reasons other than addiction are proffered and proven. 
 
This presents many possible future scenarios. Two extremes will be sketched out here. 
Should notions of addiction be extended to cover prohibitions on specific 
psychoactive substances according to their potential for harm, an expansion of both 
criminal justice system and public health governance might be anticipated. An 
increasing number of us would be designated as suffering from conditions requiring 
treatment. Pharmaceuticals providing alternative means of experiencing pleasure, or 
of blocking the pleasure-inducing effects of prohibited psychoactive substances, 
would be characterised as medication. Avenues for enhancement and claims of 
cognitive liberty would not be favoured. Alternatively, should the latter prove 
successful, pharmaceuticals enabling us to experience a range of pleasures or abilities, 
ideally with potentially harmful side effects being blocked, would be made available 
in pure, regulated form. Any psychoactive substances posing irrevocable harm to 
others, like arsenic, would continue to be subjected to safeguards in keeping with the 
criminal justice system’s protective functions. 
 
The disruption of the present systemic inconsistencies of the classification of 
psychoactive substances as lawful or unlawful which I have argued is catalysed by 
post-genomic genetics, neuroscience, happiness research, salutogenesis, and the 
discourses of pleasure, enhancement and cognitive liberty is inevitable under either 
scenario sketched out above, as well as in a range of others. Which will prove the 
more likely would appear to hinge upon the future relationship between ideas of 
freedom, medicalisation, pleasure and prohibition on the basis of harm. A crucial 
factor in determining which possible scenario will come into being will be the 
commodification of health. Part of the governance of freedom in neo-liberal society is 
the investment of commercial third parties, often in public/private partnerships, in the 
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‘shaping of the intimate’, the construction of disease entities and a commodification 
of the means by which these might be treated.70 Risk societies and the health practices 
of individuals managing their risky selves have given rise to opportunities wherein 
biovalue might be generated. Such commercial ventures offer biological citizens a 
plethora of consumer choice in the form of genetic tests, pharmacogenetically tailored 
pharmaceuticals and neurochemical means by which we might enhance our mood 
control.71 
 
Nor are the law abiding self-reflexive citizen consumers the only market for the 
products of biovalue. Pharmaceutical companies’ interests in providing medication on 
a large scale at a time when many patents for major drugs are running out have 
influenced how drugs are marketed, as well as the creation of novel disease entities 
such as female desire dysfunction disorder.72 Thus the size of the criminal justice 
system as a potential market for drugs which target neurochemistry associated with 
addiction is a substantial incentive to produce valuable additions to the arsenal of 
governance in the form of magic bullets like ritalin, which attract blanket prescription 
for behaviour which may be regarded as socially unwise. Under the first scenario, 
then, the likelihood of inappropriate medication of vulnerable offenders within the 
criminal justice system, and the ‘prophylactic’ treatment of those who are viewed as at 
risk of addiction, seems high. In that version of neo-liberal consumer society, a 
restricted range of pleasures, those which are lawful and do not make us fat, unhealthy 
or unhealthily unhappy, or in which we do not indulge to excess, would be made 
available to us within the commercial sector. Medications or medical treatments 
which restored those of us who slipped on primrose paths to return to the straight and 
narrow would be made available through the public health or the criminal justice 
system. Here the confluence of public health’s disease model of addiction, public 
health powers of compulsion, the criminal justice system’s orientation towards 
reintegration and retribution and simplistic applications of genetic and neurochemical 
knowledge, taken together, would constitute an impetus towards coercive treatment of 
so-called addicts and potential addicts which would threaten to overcome civil 
liberties protections. 
 
Yet the catalysts explored above suggest that if our behaviour in relation to 
psychoactive substances is examined in the light of happiness research and 
neuroscience, most of us find ourselves happy enough without excessive striving in a 
companionable sort of fashion, and prefer to make up our own minds about which 
pleasures we choose. Hence arguments based upon enhancement and cognitive liberty 
discourse are likely to prove appealing to many. Insofaras we may purchase access to 
pleasure as a method of achieving health, we are fulfilling our dual responsibilities as 
consumer and healthy citizen. When we pay for a year’s gym membership in order to 
maintain cardio-vascular fitness, the self-interrogation practice we engage in before 
doing so exemplifies this duality. We might weigh up the merits of gym membership 
against liposuction in terms of cost and health benefits before choosing the former. 
Many of us have no doubt traversed these decisions and transactions, particularly in 
the New Year. But most of us fall by the wayside. Almost all gym memberships lapse 
after the first three weeks. In similar fashion, the vast majority of us who embark upon 
diets of one sort or another abandon them and become fatter, despite a billion dollar 
industry selling us diets and fitness, in tangent with millions of pounds spent on 
public health exhortations to amend our ways. Does this mean we must be fixed with 
the cyclic identity of addicts in order to excuse our lack of will power, as Reith 
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contends? Or might happiness research, taken together with aspirations to 
enhancement and cognitive liberty provide an alternative way forward? 
 
Happiness research can be read as encouraging communitarian as opposed to 
consumerist ideals. The ability to locate pleasure outside judicious rational 
consumption is applauded by Lord Layard. In his view, ‘[o]ne central fallacy is to 
think that our lives should be organised for the benefit of ourselves as consumers. We 
are both consumers and producers and it makes no sense to produce a wonderful 
material lifestyle, even wonderful health services for the population, if we as workers 
and producers are becoming more miserable’.73 Characterising addiction to alcohol 
(and, by extension, other addictions) as a ‘very meaningful indicator of 
unhappiness’74, he asserts that neurochemical and social science demonstrate that self-
advancement as a primary aim leads to anxiety, and that happiness is to be found 
through assisting others as well as oneself. Hence the task of policy makers is 
accepting that all humans are of equal moral worth and working to maximise human 
happiness via distributive justice. From this perspective, the cycle of addiction, 
medicalisation and governance constrained choice described by Reith would become 
disrupted as we found happiness in terms of both pleasure and eudaimonic meaning 
through altruism, affiliation and limiting consumption. A view of one another as 
possessing equal moral worth also supports claims that we should be free to choose 
means by which to enhance our lives as an exercise of cognitive liberty. In this 
scenario, then, the biotechnological industry would be free to develop products which 
produced pleasure or enhanced capacities within regulatory safeguards without the 
need to promote these as medications for constructed diseases. Nations would prosper 
from revenue accrued from taxing such products as well as from savings in the 
criminal justice system budget. We as citizens could engage in rational evaluation, 




I have argued that neuroscience, happiness research, salutogenetic public health 
policies and the commercial potential of biovalue have contributed towards a situation 
where an explicit focus upon health as both commodity and means of governance 
entails public health policies which promote self-reflexive practices involving the 
measured manipulation of mood as not only permissible but obligatory. The strategic 
use of notions of addiction, risk and drug abuse have been used to anchor an elision of 
pleasure from past discursive strategies which have sought to promote the virtues of 
self-restraint essential for prudential self management, as neo-liberal governance 
frames resistance to these as weakness or crime. Reading health as both a commodity 
and a means of governance in neo-liberal consumer society means that treatment 
succeeds when we return to practices involving consumer choice. 
 
The relationship between pleasure and health is problematic for both public health and 
criminal justice policies as they seek to delineate boundaries of permissibility 
surrounding psychoactive substances which promote pleasure. When pleasure is 
framed as both salutogenic and pathogenic, as where, say, orgasms provide 
endorphins which enhance our immune systems but sugar promotes diabetes, the need 
to regulate the self-reflexive consumption of pleasure becomes acute. Information 
supplied for this purpose creates a rational interrogation of pleasures and their effects 
which, when applied to criminal justice system prohibitions on the use of 
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psychoactive substances, reveals systemic inconsistencies. This encourages the 
framing of the consumption of psychoactive substances as more appropriately falling 
within the public health rather than criminal justice sphere of influence. Besides this, 
it adds force to the movement to decriminalise at least some prohibited psychoactive 
substances, and suggests that pharmaceuticals created in order to enhance our 
capacities or improve our moods to render us better than well might now be 
categorisable as virtuous salutogenic medications rather than vice-ridden designer 
drugs. Pharmaceutical manufacturers anxious to exploit biovalue fully, as patent 
protections run out, are likely to press for supportive reclassification here. 
 
Thus the fragile accord between public health and criminal justice system policies 
becomes disrupted, whereupon the potential for re-evaluation of a range of pleasures, 
and the creation of new means to achieve them, is a plausible outcome. Rationales 
located in Layard’s rereading of utilitarianism, together with claims of cognitive 
liberty and the movement towards enhancement hold promise here. Perhaps, then, our 
notion of health, happiness, pleasure and criminal justice may become fleshed out to 
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